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Chapter 7
Incremental Dependencies: Politics and Ethics of 
Claim-making at the Fringes of Windhoek, Namibia
Lalli Metsola
Abstract
On the basis of a case study of informal residents’ claims over land, housing and basic 
amenities in Windhoek, Namibia, this chapter seeks to contribute to debates on the 
broad sociopolitical implications of claim-making dynamics between residents and 
public authorities. In contrast with antagonistic readings of such situations that focus 
on resistance, autonomy and rights, the chapter finds that both residents’ strategies 
and policies outline incremental paths of betterment and intersect in multiple ways. It 
ponders whether and how such incrementality produces institutionalised forms of re-
lations between citizens and authorities, and calls attention to the principle of mutual 
dependencies as a key aspect in them.
1 African Urbanities, Claim-making and Citizenship
Urbanisation is repeatedly identified as one of the key stories of our time. 
We have rapidly moved from a predominantly agrarian world into one where 
the majority of people live in cities and towns.1 It is common to associate 
this change with the grand teleological narrative of industrial development. 
However, anxieties related to perceived changes in the global economic struc-
ture and empirical observations of urbanisation without industrialisation in 
many Southern contexts, particularly in Africa, question this story. Rapid ur-
banisation thus appears both as a great promise, an incubator of creativity 
and new economic and social forms, and as a threat (Bekker and Fourchard, 
2013). On the one hand, there are visions of ‘world-class cities’ that are afflu-
ent, efficient and sustainable—these embody dreams of technologically and 
socially advanced, sustainable, clean and orderly futures. On the other hand, 
there are dystopian vistas of social and ecological decay, growing disorder and 




unequal cities divided into gated communities and proliferating slums (e.g. 
UN- Habitat, 2008). While mainstream planning perspectives on urbanism 
see the latter as problems to be managed through social, administrative and 
technological  reforms and innovations in order to create sustainable, resilient 
and inclusive cities (UN-Habitat, 2016; Mitlin, 2014), critical urban theory sees 
them as more profoundly anchored in the very structures of the global politi-
cal economy (e.g. Brenner, 2009; Marcuse, 2010). These tropes of promise and 
threat are particularly pronounced in the case of debates and studies on ‘world 
cities’ (Robinson, 2015) or ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2005).
These perspectives are largely devoid of historical, cultural or political spec-
ificity. In contrast to such approaches, this chapter suggests that it is fruitful 
both to question the instrumental focus of planning perspectives and not to 
take it as given that urbanity everywhere converges toward similar forms and 
outcomes. It calls attention to the historical formation of particular African ur-
banities and the city as a lived space versus a planned space, and to what prac-
tices bridge the gap between planning ideals and the realities of simultaneous 
growth and shortage in Southern cities. In this perspective, the workings and 
failures of formal institutions of government, what kinds of plans they make, 
and how these are implemented are not all there is to governance. Equally im-
portant are the constant work towards survival and betterment by ordinary 
residents as well as the multiple mediations, negotiations and struggles be-
tween residents, governmental agencies and various other collective bodies, 
such as neighbourhood associations, social movements, companies, churches 
or informal networks. Everyday governance grows out of this meeting and 
negotiation of different interests, ideals and aspirations, often involving pro-
visional accommodations and solutions in both formal and informal spheres 
(Blundo and Le Meur, 2008; Cornea et al., 2017).2
In many postcolonial contexts, including Africa, modern institutions of gov-
ernance were initially built upon the colonial principles of exclusion and selec-
tive recognition (Mbembe, 2001; Mamdani, 2007; Hansen and Stepputat, 2005). 
With transitions to independence, emergent states increasingly framed the 
people living in their territories as citizens instead of subjects (see e.g. Hindess, 
2005; cf. Mamdani, 1996), but the extent to which people can transform their 
legal citizenship into tangible political and economic rights and benefits has 
remained uncertain and contested. Hence citizenship is better approached as 
a claim instead of a mere ascribed status (Das, 2011). In trying to make a living, 
2 This approach is closely related to the literature that focuses on state formation and state-
hood as a process of institutional centralisation and potential fragmentation; see Metsola, 
2015, 35–51; Steinmetz, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Clapham, 1998; Das and Poole, 2004.
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enjoy basic security and gain social acceptance, people seek to be recognised 
as deserving claimants vis-à-vis various authorities (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; 
Taylor, 1994; Englund, 2004; Metsola, 2015, 75–78) by resorting to the various 
material resources, social relations and discursive registers to which they have 
access (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010). Claims can take multiple forms including 
protests, polite requests, formal applications, accusations of corruption, court 
cases or acts of occupation. This process is relational; making claims to an-
other party, whether a political office holder, state agency, traditional leader, 
local Big Man, land board or a neighbourhood association implies (even if pro-
visionally) the recognition of their authority to grant what has been demanded 
(Lund, 2006; Lund and Boone, 2013). African claim-making environments are 
often institutionally plural, which means that claimants have to assess which 
authorities they can or should turn to. In turn, authorities may compete over 
who has jurisdiction to respond to claims, seeking out claimants in their bid 
for legitimacy. Because of this, claim and response dynamics are well suited for 
exploring the development of public authority, citizenship and institutions of 
governance.
One relatively common response to the uncertainties of belonging in 
contemporary Africa has been for claimants to try to ground entitlement in 
identity and seek to narrow down the circle of those sharing that identity and 
hence entitled to a slice of the cake. This is what the politics of autochthony, 
ethnonationalism and other exclusivist reformulations of belonging familiar 
from many current or recent African citizenship struggles and conflicts try 
to do (e.g. Dorman et al., 2007; Geschiere, 2011; Nyamnjoh and Brudvig, 2014). 
While these cases are significant and attract a lot of attention, they do not 
offer the full picture of contemporary African claim-making. In many cases, 
particularly in contexts with relatively well-functioning set-ups of centralised 
institutions—in other words, stronger states—claims may also take the form 
of negotiating vis-à-vis the existing regime without reference to supposedly 
primordial identities.
While claim-making can pivot around multiple objects, land is often 
 prominent due to its importance for many different purposes: for agriculture, 
residence, as a commercial asset and, often, as a symbolically charged entity 
(for example as a burial ground or a place of worship). The significance of ac-
cess to land, the overlapping claims related to it and the multiple institutions 
regulating it have often been noted as a major issue in African politics and 
development, particularly in rural contexts (e.g. Lund, 2011; Berry, 2009; Boone, 
1998). With rapid urbanisation, urban spaces are becoming more  pronounced 
as arenas for the articulation of various, criss-crossing claims over land (Koech-
lin 2017, 3). Claims are made by national and transnational capital, by the elites, 
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but also by the vast number of people living in various degrees of precarious 
existence—the so-called informals, squatters, or subalterns.  Additionally, 
 various authorities at different levels and agencies of government, and in tra-
ditional or religious institutions, mediate the claims of others but also of each 
other.
Based on a case study of informal residents’ claims over land, housing and 
basic amenities in Windhoek, Namibia, this chapter seeks to contribute to 
 debates on the broad sociopolitical implications of claim-making dynamics 
between residents and public authorities. Through a critical conversation with 
the literature on urban claim-making in Africa and beyond, the chapter dis-
cusses incrementality as a characteristic of both residents’ strategies and poli-
cies, and the interplay between the two. Contrary to both the policy- oriented, 
top-down accounts of African social problems and their governmental 
 solutions, and antagonistic accounts of claim-making dynamics, this chapter 
explicitly connects the study of claim-making dynamics with the themes of 
institutionalisation, negotiated statehood and everyday governance, with par-
ticular attention to the principle of mutual dependencies as a key ingredient 
in the relations between residents and authorities. The chapter provides an 
overview of the interplay between residents’ demands and official responses 
in Windhoek without going deep into the details of the different positions and 
actions of various kinds of residents, or into discussing the various other ac-
tors involved such as the central government, the Shack Dwellers Federation, 
the Affirmative Repositioning movement, or entrepreneurs. These will be the 
subject of future work.3
In what follows, I will first outline some influential ways in which urban 
claim-making has been previously discussed. In particular, I make a distinction 
between antagonistic and mutualistic readings, as well as between perspec-
tives that emphasise claimants’ efforts towards political autonomy and rights 
and those that stress relations of mutual dependence between claimants and 
authorities. I will then move on to present the case of claims and responses in 
the informal settlements of Windhoek, before returning to broader analytical 
3 The fieldwork on which this case study is based took place from June to August 2016. Field 
activities consisted of interviews and conversations with ordinary residents and ground-
level community leaders. The author also interviewed officials from the City of Windhoek, 
members of local and regional government, ministry personnel, representatives of organisa-
tions working on housing and squatters’ issues, and academics, and organised a focus group 
discussion with youth leaders. He also attended a number of relevant events, including a 
meeting between the municipality’s representatives and community leaders in one informal 
settlement, a community information meeting in another, and an Affirmative Repositioning 
book launch. These sources are complemented by grey literature and media stories.
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discussion in which I focus on distinctions between instrumental clientelism 
and a more general ethos of mutual dependence, and on the developmental 
implications of such mutualities.
2 Perspectives on Urban Claim-making
In the literature on claim-making, there is a divide between what can be called 
antagonistic and mutualistic perspectives on relations between  citizens and au-
thorities. Antagonistic readings operate through a focus on social  movements, 
struggles, resistance and ‘the right to the city’ and tend to pit the interests of 
the rulers and the ruled against each other. In this view, claims result from and 
make visible the lines between the powerful and the powerless, the rich and 
the poor, the privileged ones and the disenfranchised. David Harvey (2008, 37) 
provides a good example of writing in this vein: ‘Signs of rebellion are every-
where: the unrest in China and India is chronic, civil wars rage in Africa, Latin 
America is in ferment. Any of these revolts could become contagious.’ What 
should happen, he continues, is for social movements to focus on demanding 
‘greater democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus’ 
in ‘a global struggle, predominantly with finance capital’ (Harvey, 2008, 37; see 
also Sassen, 2010).
Not all accounts of the urban condition and resistance within it are as gran-
diose. Mike Davis (2006), for one, is sceptical about such grand narratives. For 
him, ‘[p]ortentous post-Marxist speculations, like those of Negri and Hardt, 
about a new politics of “multitudes” in the “rhizomatic spaces” of globalisation 
remain ungrounded in any real political sociology. Even within a single city, 
slum populations can support a bewildering variety of responses to structural 
neglect and deprivation, ranging from charismatic churches and prophetic 
cults to ethnic militias, street gangs, neoliberal ngos, and revolutionary social 
movements.’ (Davis, 2006, 201–202.) Yet he still frames the responses of the ur-
ban ‘poor’ or ‘informals’ exclusively in terms of resistance to global capitalism: 
‘But if there is no monolithic subject or unilateral trend in the global slum, 
there are nonetheless myriad acts of resistance. Indeed, the future of human 
solidarity depends upon the militant refusal of the new urban poor to accept 
their terminal marginality within global capitalism.’ (Davis, 2006, 202.)
While this perspective captures a significant aspect of claim-making and re-
sponse dynamics, many such interactions are not captured by its interpretive 
lens. A more ethnographically oriented body of scholarship has moved beyond 
the focus on explicit (and globally oriented) resistance and added  nuance to 
our understanding of the political agency of informals (Das and Randeria, 2015; 
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Simone, 2013; Bayat, 2010; Holston, 2008). A number of important points from 
this literature could be raised, but as there is no room for extensive discussion 
I will highlight two that are most important for my purposes. First, many of the 
actions of informal urban residents do not take the form of conscious, collec-
tive political action but occur in the form of disconnected, mundane actions 
that have practical aims. Second, they are not necessarily antagonistic, but 
involve significant degrees of reciprocity, mutuality and negotiation. For ex-
ample, through studies on the daily realities of ‘urban poor’ in Egypt and Iran, 
Asef Bayat (2000, 2010, 2015) points out the shortcomings of perspectives that 
see the poor as merely surviving instead of having long-term dreams, plans and 
strategies, as well as of perspectives that tend to focus excessively on their or-
ganised collective action through the prism of resistance. Instead, Bayat high-
lights what he refers to as ‘quiet encroachment’, the multiple ways in which 
squatters engage in clandestine, piecemeal actions primarily aimed towards 
individual, family or other immediate group betterment, and how this may 
have systematic, unintended, collective—and hence political—outcomes. 
James Holston (2008), in turn, has focused on how poor urbanites in Brazil 
have staked claims through land occupation, auto-construction and legal ac-
tion, in the process gaining increasing traction as a political force and realising 
their citizen rights. However, later studies have observed that the movements 
that initially spoke about ‘rights to the city’ and took an antagonistic stance 
towards public authorities have since been demobilised as their demands for 
recognition and participation, and to some extent their agency, was co-opted 
into official doctrines and practices (Caldeira, 2015).
While both Bayat and Holston have produced richly contextualised re- 
conceptualisations of precarious existence in Southern settings, they retain 
the antagonistic focus that juxtaposes residents and state power and portrays 
increasing autonomy and citizen rights as the eventual objective of the former. 
In contrast, this chapter suggests that there may be a significant degree of mu-
tuality in the claim and response dynamics involving informal urban dwellers.
3 Claiming Residence, Welfare and Security at the  
Fringes of Windhoek
In Namibia, urbanisation is proceeding rapidly, both through population 
growth occurring in the city and continuous in-migration propelled by persis-
tent rural poverty and hopes of better opportunities. This strains the capacities 
of city and town administrations. Coupled with pervasive unemployment and 
rising land prices and housing costs, this has resulted in widespread precarity 
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among urban dwellers. At the same time, the country’s stability and relatively 
high administrative capacity and economic performance facilitate the  pooling 
of resources and significant redistributive mechanisms through state coffers. 
Together, these conditions help generate popular demands for translating 
the political inclusion of legal citizenship into social and economic inclusion 
through the provision of opportunities, jobs, health, education, housing and 
basic amenities.
3.1 Informal Settlements and Their Residents
Before Namibian independence, migration was severely restricted and ‘illegal’ 
settlement not tolerated. Independence set in motion a heavy influx of people 
from rural areas to cities and towns. Windhoek has grown from a city of un-
der 150,000 inhabitants at independence to one with over 400,000 now. High 
demand for residential land and housing, together with a complicated and 
costly process of surveying, demarcating and servicing has pushed the prices 
of houses as well as rents beyond what most urban residents are able to pay. 
Therefore, most urban population growth occurs in informal settlements on 
municipal land in the north-western and western fringes of the city, mostly 
in the constituencies of Moses Garoeb, Tobias Hainyeko, Samora Machel and 
Khomasdal North.
There are many kinds of informality. In the extreme outskirts of the city, 
new, relatively sparsely populated and completely unserviced areas constant-
ly spring up with more land becoming occupied. Older informal settlements 
have gradually become congested but have often been provided with basic ser-
vices like public prepaid water taps, communal toilets, and some paved streets 
and street lights. Yet other areas are still predominantly filled with kambashus 
(shacks) but have already been demarcated into individual plots that are usu-
ally fenced. Additionally, there are small tracts of informal residence in open 
areas within established townships, as well as shacks in people’s backyards, 
used for renting out. Many of the research participants had at some point 
moved from one informal area to another due to various reasons, including 
less noise and congestion, better location, available services, cheaper living 
 expenses, security considerations, avoiding problematic relations with rela-
tives, or acquiring more space in a newer area.
Likewise, the people who live in informal areas or conditions should not be 
seen as a single group of ‘squatters’. They consist of employed, partially em-
ployed, unemployed, students and pensioners; people with different levels of 
income, different social connections and at different stages of their life cycles. 
The sizes of their homes, mostly built of corrugated iron, as well as the ameni-
ties in them vary considerably. Some only consist of one room with next to 
169Incremental Dependencies
<UN>
nothing inside, while at the other end of the spectrum there are homes with 
multiple rooms, electricity (either tapped illicitly from permanent houses 
nearby or powered by solar panels or a generator), fridges, stoves, windows 
and quite a lot of furniture, even inside toilets. These have often been built 
 incrementally over time, as resources permit. While people strive towards 
 better life through degrees of formalisation, changes can occur in the opposite 
direction too, with informalisation—moving to a shack—providing an outlet 
in a situation in which formal accommodation has become financially unsus-
tainable. In some cases, living informally is a choice that facilitates saving a 
larger portion of one’s incomes for other, longer-term purposes, such as pur-
chasing land or investing in property in rural areas (see also Niikondo, 2010; 
Kamminga, 2000, 51). Indeed, many research participants referred to existing 
links to their places of origin and to their wish to retire there. Furthermore, not 
all shacks are for residence—some are also for business; people may own more 
than one and rent them out, or use them as shebeens (informal bars).
3.2 Actors and Policies
Numerous actors populate the organisational landscape related to the issues 
of land, housing and services in Windhoek. These include the City, the central 
government, savings groups and their umbrella organisation the Shack Dwell-
ers Federation, and—more recently—the Affirmative Repositioning move-
ment (AR). I will provide a brief overview of this landscape before moving on 
to discuss the interplay between residential claims and the City.
The Shack Dwellers Federation is ‘a network of 605 saving schemes with 
20400 members throughout the country’.4 Savings groups, either independent 
ones or those belonging to the Federation, purchase or lease plots that the City 
then provides with a basic level of services on a collective basis. The groups 
subdivide the plot among members and each of them can develop their share 
incrementally (City of Windhoek, 1999; City of Windhoek, n.d. b). This model 
is not without its problems, for example related to the management of funds 
and collective services, but it has provided a significant avenue for many poor 
residents to achieve different degrees of improvements, including access to 
formal housing and basic services.
While the achievements of the Shack Dwellers Federation and independent 
savings groups are considerable, only a minority of informal residents have 
benefited from them. The persistent and growing land and housing short-
age led to the emergence of a new militant movement called Affirmative 




 Repositioning in 2014. Led by prominent young political figures with a history 
in the swapo Youth League, it started a high-profile campaign regarding urban 
land availability. Its rhetoric has been openly hostile to the established politi-
cal elite, with a mixture of radical socialist and Pan-African themes (AR book 
launch, 4.8.2016). In response to the pressure from the AR, the central gov-
ernment revitalised some previously problematic and hence inactive housing 
 programmes. These include the Build Together Programme, originally  started 
in 1992 and meant to provide housing loans for low- and middle- income house-
holds, and the Mass Housing Programme that provides subsidised ready units. 
Additionally, the government started a Mass Urban Land Servicing  Project 
with the promise of delivering 200,000 plots countrywide for residential pur-
poses. So far, progress in delivering these has been slow.
Neither of the abovementioned organisations is a mass-based popular 
squatters’ movement like for example Abahlali baseMjondolo in neighbouring 
South Africa. The Shack Dwellers Federation has considerable real presence 
on the ground, particularly among women, but has not adopted similar an-
tagonistic rhetoric and broadly political objectives as Abahlali base Mjondolo. 
Instead, it focuses on more immediate practical questions of housing and of-
ten cooperates with public agencies. Affirmative Repositioning, in turn, does 
speak a militant language that situates the issues of urban land, housing and 
services in the context of broader injustices. However, on the basis of my ob-
servations and discussions with Windhoekers of various walks of life it seems 
to draw much of its support from among the young middle-class and to not 
have an equally strong support base among informal residents.
While the above policies and organisations play a significant role, the inter-
action between informal residents and the municipality through immediate 
or low-level official channels is the primal node in the claim and response dy-
namics in Windhoek. This is, first, because informal settlements have mostly 
grown on municipal land, and second, because the City has considerable au-
tonomy over the generation of its own revenue and budget but is also expected 
to cater for its expenses without central government subvention, apart from 
specific, earmarked capital expenditures. Hence, my primary focus here is with 
the claims and responses between residents in various informal settlements 
and the City.
In day-to-day practice, the City is not a unitary actor and the approach of 
different agencies, or the line taken in regulating the use of municipal land, 
may vary at different moments and in different situations. Sometimes those 
working in the City structures stress that ‘we cannot condone illegal settle-
ment’ (as one of my City civil servant interviewees put it, and the Head of the 
City Police confirmed) while others accept the reality of rapid urban growth 
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and try to think of practical ways to address the situation. However, many City 
 employees dealing with ‘informals’ argued that they are ‘fighting a losing battle’. 
In practice, informal residence has been mostly tolerated since independence 
and as I shall demonstrate below, the City has, in principle, accepted that the 
problem should be addressed through constructive engagement rather than 
through harsh control.
The first response by the City to the heavy influx of squatters in the early 
1990s was to establish three ‘reception areas’ where new residents were given 
rental plots with rudimentary services. It was assumed that once the new resi-
dents had established themselves they would be able to find formal accom-
modation and move out. This did not happen. (City of Windhoek, n.d. a; World 
Bank, 2002, 17–18.) As the spread of low-income informal areas continued, the 
City outlined a new housing policy (City of Windhoek, 2000) and a concomi-
tant development and upgrading strategy (City of Windhoek, 1999). Drawing 
from such international precedents as Mexico and Botswana, as well as World 
Bank guidelines (City of Windhoek, n.d. a), these documents advocated a tran-
sition from seeing informal residents as lawbreakers and a mere problem into a 
participatory approach that sees them as active agents trying to improve their 
lives. As put in the City’s guidelines on informal settlements in the mid-1990s, 
‘[t]his should not be seen as yet another project to mend squatter problems 
in Windhoek, but rather a process proposed to positively accommodate and 
manage informal settlements in the City. In addition it must be realised that, in 
order for this process to succeed, traditional views (confine people to a specific 
area to exercise control over them) on informal settlement shall have to be 
discarded’ (City of Windhoek, n.d. a, 6).
The development and upgrading strategy combines in situ upgrading of 
existing settlements with establishing new residential areas under the sites-
and-services model (City of Windhoek, 1999; World Bank, 2002, 9). The strategy 
outlines seven development levels of upgrading that differ from each other in 
terms of resident income, tenure arrangements, service levels and payments 
(City of Windhoek, 1999, 4; World Bank, 2002, 10). Levels 0–3 consist of ‘ul-
tra-low income’ areas with gradually increasing levels of communal services. 
Tenure at levels 1–2 is primarily lease-based (City of Windhoek, 1999: Annex-
ure A). For most of the people (over 80 per cent in the early years of the new 
millennium) this was the only affordable level of officially recognised tenure 
(de Kock, 2006, 28–29; City of Windhoek, 2000, 4). Block layout at level 1 re-
mains informal, while levels 2 and 3 consist of demarcated erven (plots) that 
the residents lease or purchase. Levels 4–6 refer to low- and middle-income 
areas, with individually owned plots and individual service connections (City 
of Windhoek, 1999: Annexure A).
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The areas selected for upgrading tend to be heavily congested. This leads to 
the requirement that some move out to make way for the upgrading and new 
subdivision of plots. Who can stay is primarily decided on a first come, first 
served basis, with those who have arrived in the area first getting to stay. For 
this purpose, the City registers residents on a waiting list and numbers their 
shacks. In practice, most communities currently remain at the lowest three 
levels. Upgrading is slow and the situation of partial informality and partial 
formality may become a relatively lasting state. City officials and other observ-
ers give multiple reasons for this state of affairs. City representatives argue that 
they will not be able to solve the problem without central government subven-
tions. Other crucial resources noted as often lacking are land for resettlement, 
time, will and capacity.
3.3 Residents’ Claims and Their Negotiation
Participation and incremental upgrading have been the official policy for over 
15 years. The approach has permeated the lived experience and colonised the 
claim-making processes of informal urban dwellers to a considerable extent, 
so that their claims largely mirror the incremental upgrading strategy. In part, 
such residents always have to frame their demands in a way that is intelligible 
to those in a position to respond. However, the doctrine of incremental upgrad-
ing also offers a possibility to gradually transform non-tolerated practices into 
tolerated ones, illicitness into licitness, and informality into formality. It offers 
the residents a stepping stone via which to start actively working towards a 
more secure existence in the city.
Among my research participants, water and sanitation were usually the pri-
mary needs expressed, followed by electricity, and then paved roads and street 
lights. Additionally, a concern over security is a recurring theme. Finally, after 
these basic needs, having one’s own house under a secure tenure arrangement 
of some kind represents the eventual ideal. These aspirations seem to form a 
partially overlapping series, in which the focus of needs and demands would 
shift as the situation of provision changed. Claim-making over these needs has 
taken many forms: petitioning the authorities in public meetings or through 
community leaders and councillors, writing letters to officials, sending smss to 
newspapers, and in some rare cases, protests against evictions.
There are two kinds of community leaders. The first one includes a tier sys-
tem based on areas of residence that extends from the level of the regional 
councillor responsible for a constituency through community chairpersons 
responsible for different settlements within the constituency and consisting 
of a few hundred households, to block leaders responsible for about 20–30 
households each (City of Windhoek, 1999, 13–14; City of Windhoek, 2011). 
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This is in accordance with the City’s Development and Upgrading Strategy, 
which states that ‘[i]n Development Levels 1–3 […] or any other situation 
where a  community has access to communal services […] [t]he community 
(20 to 30 households sharing the same toilet block) must democratically elect 
a constituted formal neighbourhood committee and a chairperson […] The 
aim of such neighbourhood committees will be […] [t]o act as communica-
tion  channel with Council […]; To empower the communities to run their own 
 organisation, finances, maintenance, cleaning of services and problem solving; 
To lessen the burden on Council in terms of resources needed for community 
liaison, administration, credit control, maintenance, etc.; To facilitate a struc-
ture through which saving and self-help actions may be promoted; To create 
a structure through which education, training and capacity building may be 
effectively carried over to individual households’ (City of Windhoek, 1999, 13).
The other kind consists of constituency development committees. Each 
constituency has one of them and their membership is drawn from people who 
reside in the constituency and represent different walks of life. For example, 
in Moses Garoeb constituency in Northwestern Windhoek, the cdc members 
are classified as representing the following categories: community, youth, tra-
ditional authority, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, City of Windhoek, Family 
of Hope Services (an ngo assisting orphaned and vulnerable children), Youth 
Forum, businesses, The Evangelic Lutheran Church in Namibia, the Ministry 
of Defence and the Ministry of Agriculture (information obtained from the 
Moses Garoeb constituency office, August 2016; see also Republic of Namibia 
1998, Appendix ii).
These two kinds of leaders occupy a key position between informal resi-
dents and higher levels of authority. They live in the areas that they represent 
and are usually the first layer of administration to hear the residents’ concerns 
and are entrusted to campaign for them with regard to the City and other au-
thorities. At the same time, they are the main channel of news and directives 
in the other direction, from higher administrative levels to the communities. 
They also regulate land use and mediate disputes; they do not have any official 
policing or judicial capacity but are recognised as arbiters of less serious cases 
of disagreement or misbehaviour. Grass-roots local leaders are not remuner-
ated for their services but in practice such positions might offer them lever-
age with which to advance their own agendas of betterment, as some of them 
openly admitted, for example by enabling them to be among the first in line 
when improvements occur. In many respects, their role resembles that of a tra-
ditional headman, and indeed their blocks were often referred to as ‘villages’.
To give an example of the interactions between such leaders and  higher 
 administrative tiers, in one old informal settlement in Tobias Hainyeko 
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 constituency, the community leaders had long been sending letters to the 
City, and the Mayor in particular, requesting that the latter meet them and 
address their concerns. During my fieldwork, they eventually got their wish 
and a meeting between the Mayor, City officials, City councillors, the Regional 
Councillor and the community leaders from various informal settlements in 
that constituency was held. In the meeting, the community leaders were given 
room to air their concerns. These were primarily of a practical nature, focusing 
on the provision and maintenance of services as well as the desired alloca-
tion of erven. However, there were also more general, and critical, interven-
tions,  focusing on what was perceived as a lack of will or capacity of those 
responsible for delivering land and services. For example, an old man who was 
a member of the elders’ council in his area quite straightforwardly pointed out 
what he saw as the discrepancy between promises and actual delivery, stating 
that ‘promises made ten years ago hurt us. Why do you run when people in 
other areas ask you to come? Why are services not given here like in town?’ 
As the questions and comments were collected, there was no direct answer to 
these questions. In their responses to all the queries and pleas that were heard, 
the ceo of the City and the Mayor referred to their responsibility to cater 
for the needs of the whole city with limited funds. While basic services were a 
human right, said the Mayor, changes could not happen overnight. The Mayor 
and City representatives further pointed out that more efficient implementa-
tion aided by  community involvement and sharing of information would be 
key to making the most of available resources. In general, the principles of 
 affordability and cost recuperation recurred in my interviews with City repre-
sentatives. From the perspective of informal residents such principles might 
be a bitter pill to swallow, as they seem to embody new arrangements of privi-
lege that perpetuate the stark inequalities inherited from the racial hierarchy 
of settler colonialism.
The leadership structure described above is formally geared towards de-
velopmental aims (upgrading and services) but it has significant political 
effects. In principle, the structures of community leadership are administra-
tive, not political positions—as one of the leaders firmly asserted to me and 
as the City’s guidelines also stipulate (City of Windhoek, 2011, 4). In practice, 
however, swapo structures and government structures often overlap at the 
grass-roots level through the persons holding positions in them. While I did 
not systematically chart this issue, at least in the areas where I worked most of 
the leaders I met had previously been active in party structures or continued 
to be so (see also Kamminga 2000, 50–51). Furthermore, they closely cooper-
ate with regional and City councillors, which are politically elected positions. 
In Windhoek, all of the regional councillors for constituencies where there 
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are  informal  settlements belong to swapo and 12 out of 15 City councillors 
 represent the ruling party. In the eyes of such elected officials, issues of wel-
fare provision are of high political significance: ‘they elect us’, as one regional 
councillor put it.
Notably, in the context of Namibian urban residential politics, people are 
striving to become visible and recognised through various forms of claim-
making. They want to be registered and have their details recorded instead of 
resorting to tactics of invisibility or exit. This is because they mostly do not see 
the political and administrative authorities of regional and local government 
as a threat but rather as key in controlling access to secure residence in the city. 
Hence acceptance of their bureaucratic requirements is a precondition for be-
coming a beneficiary. Hence, they do not resist becoming subjects of the data 
generation exercises of the City but are, on the contrary, trying hard to enter its 
surveys, waiting lists and classifications; measures that constitute an integral 
part of biopolitical ‘legibility’ and control of contemporary postcolonial states 
(Das and Poole, 2004).
The above point should be qualified by noting a key moment when resi-
dents’ strategies concerning visibility change. In the past, the City used to re-
move at will ‘illegal’ squatters from sites designated for development. However, 
a few years ago, a group of squatters, assisted by the public law firm Legal Assis-
tance Centre, challenged this practice in court. Eventually, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the sections of the Squatters Proclamation of 19855 that authorise 
the demolition of squatters’ shacks are unconstitutional (Ellinger, 2015, 10–11). 
Since then, squatters cannot be removed without a court order and them being 
provided with an alternative place to settle. This has led to a game of cat and 
mouse in which the City Police tries to prevent people from establishing their 
presence in an area in the first place while the aspirant residents try again, of-
ten during the night, until they succeed. After this, they cannot be evicted and 
can start their incremental struggle towards formalisation. Obviously, the issue 
of whether one can be considered to already reside in a structure or not is not 
straightforward to assess and may lead to contested evictions.6
3.4 Summing Up the Situation in Windhoek
The antagonistic forms of claim-making, such as AR campaigning or sporadic 
movements to oppose evictions, have received the most media attention and 
are therefore visible to broader publics. Nevertheless, most claims over urban 
5 Proclamation AG 21; Official Gazette Extraordinary of South West Africa No. 5047, 7–17.
6 See the High Court case of Junias vs. The Municipal Council of the Municipality of Windhoek 
(A 35/2014) for an illustrative discussion of such assessment.
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land, services and housing have long taken the form of residents’ everyday tac-
tics to try to incrementally gain a foothold to reside securely in the city. They 
have combined this with campaigning towards the City and ‘the government’ 
through community leaders and councillors. These claims mirror a policy of 
participatory incrementality in the informal settlement upgrading strategy 
of the City of Windhoek, and resonate with the operating logic of the Shack 
Dwellers Federation as well as the provisions of the recent Flexible Land 
 Tenure Act. The slow rate of delivery has made room for land occupations that 
can be transformed into open claims after establishing oneself on a site.
Significantly, it is not one, straightforward demand that is made and re-
sponded to in this arena, but rather a shifting front line that moves from one 
aspiration to another through a series of claims and responses. In the process, 
residents’ strategies and official responses have increasingly converged. The 
former have gradually sought to improve their access to land, housing and ser-
vices, as well as their legal standing and security, while the latter have sought to 
transform informality into formality through step-by-step increases in tenure 
security, incremental provision of housing and services and the mobilisation 
of ‘self-help’ to facilitate such improvements.
Even though such incrementality works on practical questions it also pro-
duces relations of citizenship and authority. To give an example, let me refer 
to the requirement of the City, discussed above, for the residents of informal 
settlements to elect leaders to represent them vis-à-vis the authorities. While 
this arises from the practical needs related to communal service provision, it 
leads to residents of such areas having to align their interests and form or-
ganised communities—at least to some extent—instead of advancing their 
lot through disconnected strategies. At the same time, it leads the residents to 
invest their trust in and channel their aspirations through the agencies admin-
istering their affairs, thus reinforcing the authority of such agencies.
Contrary to what the proponents of formalisation through titling (most no-
tably de Soto, 2000) propose, formality and informality in such a context are 
not necessarily clear-cut, either/or conditions. Rather, through the emergence 
of informal markets in land and housing, gradual official accommodation 
through enumeration, service provision and upgrading policies, court deci-
sions against eviction, participation in savings groups and legislative instru-
ments that outline a gradual path towards formalisation,7 residents who start 
7 Namibia has recently passed the Flexible Land Tenure Act, which provides for a formalisa-
tion path that recognises the slow and incremental nature of informal settlement upgrad-
ing. It consists of a step-by-step model of tenure, with different grades of title schemes; see 
 Republic of Namibia (2016).
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out in a condition of nearly absolute informality may move towards formality 
as their claims are increasingly recognised. In the process the land that they 
occupy and the structures they erect on it increasingly gain the characteristics 
of property.8 However, the process also involves a simultaneous informalisa-
tion of formal regulations through repeated practical and tactical negotiations 
of rules of entitlement and precedence.
Importantly, such processes have been taking place at the fringes of Wind-
hoek for sufficiently long to have become incorporated in the tacit practical 
knowledge of the residents and hence to inform their actions. Thus, while the 
slow rate of improvement causes impatience, the prospects of gradual better-
ment and the public authorities’ significant role in facilitating it translate dis-
satisfaction into recurrent claims through officially accepted channels rather 
than into more antagonistic forms of activism. In other words, they serve the 
ends of stabilisation and pacification instead of immediate transformation.
4 The Logic of Mutuality
What kinds of insights does the above case of residential claims on the fringes 
of Windhoek offer for diversifying and clarifying the analytical vocabulary of 
claim-making dynamics? While the above observations concur with some of 
Bayat’s (2000, 2010, 2015) and Holston’s (2008) points on quiet encroachment 
and insurgent citizenship, there are also important differences. This is possi-
bly in part because of the dissimilarities between Namibia and, on the one 
hand, the more purely authoritarian settings of Egypt and Iran, and on the 
other, the firmer tradition of articulate social movements in Brazil. The rela-
tions between ‘the state’ (and ‘the City’) and the ‘informals’ in Namibia are 
not necessarily separate and opposite but may permeate each other, leading 
to co-optation and collusion. Informal residents in Windhoek do not always 
acquire what they need clandestinely, nor do they necessarily seek autonomy 
and legal rights. They often tap into formal political channels and processes to 
make claims to increased residential security and welfare through a combina-
tion of persuasion, pressure and cooperation in the form of requests, seeking 
media attention, threatening to withdraw their political allegiance from the 
ruling party, and the officially endorsed policy of participation.
At first glance, such relations would seem to fit the picture of clientelism as 
they mobilise vertical loyalties between particular local and regional govern-
ment representatives, community leaders and groups of residents, and involve 
8 For a closely related argument in the context of Indonesia, see Nurman and Lund (2016).
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the exchange of material and legal improvement for the informal residents to 
their compliance. In this sense, these relations reproduce the party–state at 
ground level and also involve the possibility of partial inclusions and exclu-
sions (see also, e.g., Patel, 2016; Hammett, 2017, 5). Indeed, clientelism is the 
explanatory model suggested by some authors for understanding urban Afri-
can claim-making dynamics (see e.g. Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2014; Mitlin, 
2014). While the above relations are very real and important to note, my analy-
sis suggests that the notion of clientelism might be inadequate for understand-
ing the dependencies involved. This is because of, first, its instrumentalism 
and insufficiently theorised agency, and second, the tendency of clientelist ex-
planations to associate mutual dependencies with inefficiency and stagnancy.
While the play of claims and responses in Windhoek may involve a con-
siderable amount of tactical consideration out of personal or partisan in-
terests, these are not the only set of rules that enter the game. Beyond their 
own immediate needs, the claims and statements of the residents repeatedly 
imagine a shared political community where everyone is entitled to basic 
welfare—housing, water, sanitation, electricity and basic security. There is a 
widely shared and firm belief that ‘the government’ should help those in need 
and that this is possible because of abundant national resources and a small 
population. Residents often told me that they will find a way to pay their bills 
and build their houses little by little if the government ‘meets them halfway’ 
with land, services and public assistance. Explanations for why this is not hap-
pening enough included the lack of funds and capacity within the structures 
of the City, but also lack of political will. High-ranking politicians and civil 
servants are said to be involved in urban land speculation, benefiting from in-
flated house and rental prices. Contractors and their frontmen (referred to as 
‘tenderpreneurs’) are said to utilise their networks to gain tenders at well above 
reasonable prices. Provision of affordable housing on a large scale would cut 
into these sources of income. In other words, the residents criticise particular 
leaders, but their criticism does not amount to questioning the relationship 
of mutual dependence as much as claiming that that relationship is not suf-
ficiently honoured. This ethos provides a ground for assessing the performance 
of leaders—whether they care sufficiently or not—and the leaders know this. 
In this context, the knowledge production related to upgrading, including sur-
veys, the enumeration of shacks, waiting lists, and meetings to share informa-
tion, serve as forms of impatience management and respond to the regularly 
expressed need of the residents to be heard by the authorities.
While the gradual, multiform negotiation between rulers and their subjects 
has been identified as crucial for the formation of ‘social contracts’ and insti-
tutions of governance (Hickey, 2010; Nugent, 2010), such negotiations do not 
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always occur in the same ways and yield similar results. Settings where the 
ethos of mutual dependence enjoys broad acceptance seem fundamentally 
different from contracts supposedly resulting from Hobbesian self-interest but 
also from the more procedural individualism of social liberalism (most nota-
bly Rawls (1971)). However, strategic bartering in which favours are exchanged 
for adherence might not offer a fully satisfactory explanation either. Rather, 
ideas of reciprocal, yet hierarchical dependence with an imperative of sharing 
have been identified as a significant component of the constitution of many 
southern African societies (see Ferguson, 2013, 2015; Englund, 2015; Friedman, 
2011; Gulbrandsen, 2012).9 They construct an ethos of a political community 
whose sociality precedes and is more fundamental than the individual aspira-
tions of its members. The exact origins of this moral universe may be multiple, 
and their extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. What seems 
likely, however, is that the particular form that African state formation took 
during the colonial and early postcolonial periods may have played no small 
part in contributing towards the centrality of such forms of authority and def-
erence. It formed a key part of what Mbembe (2001, 45) has called ‘the trinity of 
violence, allocations and transfers’ that combined coercion with the strategic 
recognition of key segments of the population and reciprocal chains of dis-
tribution and loyalty (see also Englebert, 2009; Bayart, 2000). Ideas of mutual 
dependence become embedded in subjectivities due to their long histories 
and social prevalence. Hence, they are ontological rather than purely ethical 
principles. Furthermore, such dispositions may have a significant aesthetic 
component in addition to the ethical one, directing assessments of what are 
intelligible and acceptable forms of making claims. Hence, for example, the 
ire that the rhetoric of Affirmative Repositioning has raised among those in 
power. Quite often, their angry reactions have related less to the content of 
AR’s demands and more to their form, which allegedly demonstrates a lack of 
respect towards figures of authority. Critical comments by ordinary informal 
residents almost invariably focused on the same issue, while they tended to 
agree with the expressed objectives of the AR. For them, the preference of AR 
leaders for antagonistic expression seemed to amount to a denial of the asym-
metrical, para-familial relationship of loyalty and care.
The other problem with clientelist (and more broadly, neo-patrimonialist) 
readings of African contexts is their association of mutualist politics with in-
efficiency and stagnancy. This overlooks the potential, unforeseen long-term 
9 As Ferguson (2013) points out, an Afrobarometer survey found that ‘a solid majority (60 per 




consequences of processes of mutual negotiation and recognition, possibly 
including prospects for social inclusion, material improvements and political 
participation. Claims of recognition and dependence are intimately related to 
resource politics. They may take the form of including some in, and exclud-
ing some from, resources and welfare through group-based criteria of merit. 
More positively, they may contribute to the reproduction of and reliance on 
the relatively immediate socialities of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood or 
religious community. However, it seems that they may also give rise to the 
 institutionalisation of broader, even universalist politics of distribution and 
welfare in contexts where the economic and administrative base permits this. 
For Kelsall (2013), ‘developmental patrimonialism’ refers to settings of suc-
cessful institutionalisation based on entrenching patrimonial authority in 
 structures broader and more durable than the reign of any particular ruler, for 
example those of the ruling party or the bureaucracy. What is significant is 
that in such a perspective the logic of mutuality is not necessarily opposite to, 
but is possibly compatible with development. Kelsall’s focus is on the agency 
of the elites, but gains added resonance when the implicit ‘social contract’ ex-
pressed in the ideal of mutuality and the demands it places on rulers are taken 
into account. From this perspective, could the growing urban settlements with 
their constantly moving, negotiated frontier of claims and responses over time 
provide a laboratory for the development of novel institutional arrangements?
Such cities do not seem to be incubators of the same kind of individuation 
that Weber wrote about in The City (Weber, 1978, 1212–1372). What we see in 
them, rather, is the increasing unmooring of distinct identities, but not neces-
sarily of the logic of mutual dependence. The latter may actually gain further 
impetus from the erosion of economic mediation through wage labour in Afri-
ca. For sure, this mediation never was as pervasive there as in Northern indus-
trial societies. Still, it offered a significant organising principle in postcolonial 
societies, particularly when linked to the loyalties and obligations of redistri-
bution through kin networks through which salaries lubricated welfare and 
social reproduction beyond their immediate recipients (Mbembe, 2001; Roit-
man, 2007). This is no longer the case, as changes in production technologies, 
coupled with the erosion of debt-driven development, austerity measures of 
structural adjustment, and the end of the Cold War support chains have ush-
ered in what many authors have identified as an era of jobless growth (Li, 2013; 
Ferguson, 2015; Englund, 2015). Such southern African states as South  Africa, 
Botswana and Namibia are heavily reliant on the capital-intensive extraction 
of minerals and a large part of their populations remain superfluous to the 
formal economy. In spite of this, they remain relatively stable and their econ-
omies and administrative institutions function relatively well. They do have 
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highly unequal patterns of income and wealth but have still taken  significant 
steps in tackling poverty and improving the welfare of their citizens. This has 
involved extensions in social policy, including broad-based cash grant schemes 
such as universal, non-contributory old-age pension disability grants, child 
support grants, war veteran benefits, and even experiments in basic income 
grants (Ferguson, 2015; Metsola, 2015; Devereux, 2013; Stewart and Yermo, 2009; 
Pelham, 2007).
5 Conclusion
Through a case of study of incremental and mutually constitutive claims 
and responses by Namibian residents of informal settlements and  public 
 authorities, this chapter has questioned the general applicability of such 
 interpretations of claim-making dynamics that focus on resistance, autono-
my or instrumental clientelism. In the Namibian context, claims rather tend 
to reflect and construct a relational ethics of mutual dependence. This high-
lights the importance of contextual specificity. Claim-making processes tend 
to be simultaneously about concrete goods, resources or benefits and about 
 inclusion. However, to understand the kind of political subjectivity and socio-
political  relationships imagined by this demand—for example, whether it is 
about  being recognised as rights-bearing individual citizens or as ‘children’ 
under the custody of the state—requires careful, context-specific exploration. 
Furthermore, it requires taking people’s dispositions and beliefs seriously in-
stead of deciding their veracity or value on their behalf.
Residents’ claim-making in Namibia does not represent an extension of 
rights or democratising politics directly. Rather, its modus operandi recon-
structs relations of reciprocal dependence. However, this negotiation does 
represent deep-seated desires for social and economic justice and inclusion 
in the national body politic. While the real advances related to residents’ 
claim- making and responses are limited and their durability is not certain, 
the policies and practices of participatory incrementality reflect and help re-
construct an ideal of responsive public authority that goes beyond immediate 
instrumental utility. Over time, this negotiation may offer a basis for endur-
ing institutional responses that generate broad-based legitimacy and stability. 
However, this is far from a self-evident outcome, as dependencies can be used 
strategically, in a measured way, to appease and pacify. The question, then, is 
whether the gradual responses necessary for tempering popular claims even-
tually make room for and encourage such forms of political consciousness and 
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